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NOTES
Rocked by Rocket: Applying Oklahoma’s MRTA to
Severed Mineral Interests After Rocket v. Donabar
I. Introduction
In a 2005 quiet-title suit now approaching infamy—Rocket v.
Donabar1—the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that some thirty-six
years previous, on November 18, 1969, Oklahoma’s Marketable Record
Title Act (MRTA) severed and extinguished the mineral rights beneath
appellant Clark Tomassian’s property.2 All agree that, before that date,
Tomassian’s predecessor in interest held the forty-acre tract in fee simple.3
The divesting document—a mineral conveyance filed November 18, 1929,
in the chain of title of appellee Rocket Oil and Gas (Rocket Oil)—
ultimately derived from a stranger to title.4
A. Background
In many ways the hubbub surrounding Rocket since its announcement is
surprising. The modus operandi, if not the raison d’etre, of Oklahoma’s
MRTA (indeed all the progeny of the Model Marketable Title Act) is the
extinguishment of properly recorded and filed property interests—
regardless of the strength or legitimacy of the underlying claims—in order
to establish defect-free title.5 Subject to a few notable exceptions, the only
factor determining which interests are extinguished and which are

1. Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar, 2005 OK CIV APP 111, 127 P.3d 625. I would
like to thank Oklahoma title attorney Jereme Cowan for bringing this case to my attention
and providing invaluable feedback for this Note.
2. Id. ¶ 48, 127 P.3d at 636.
3. Id.
4. Id. ¶ 41, 127 P.3d at 634. Black’s defines “stranger” as “one not standing toward
another in some relation implied in the context.” Stranger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). A stranger to title, then, is someone who purports to convey a property interest yet
does not have recorded title as to the interest conveyed.
5. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 73 (2011) (“[S]uch marketable record title shall be . . . free and
clear of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any
act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title.
All such interests, claims or charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable,
present or future, whether such interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris
or under a disability, whether such person is within or without the state, whether such person
is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null and
void.”).

381

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

382

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:381

preserved is the dates on which the documents creating or preserving the
interests were filed.6
Nevertheless, this case, its implications, and the rationale underlying its
result remain a source of significant discussion and confusion among
Oklahoma oil and gas title attorneys.7 The primary point of contention
concerns the type of property interests to which the MRTA applies.8 It was
the common belief of many if not most Oklahoma title lawyers that severed
mineral interests were altogether outside the realm of the MRTA’s action.9
This notion was not unfounded: section 76(A) of the statute stipulates that
the act cannot be applied “to bar or extinguish any mineral or royalty
interest which has been severed from the fee simple title of the land.”10
Generally, prior to Rocket, practitioners interpreted this language to bar the
MRTA’s use on all title chains containing severed mineral interests.11
While not directly addressing the issue, Rocket’s holding presumably
contradicts this notion.12 No doubt after the opinion came down, more than
one attorney awoke in a cold sweat, wondering how many opinions she had
gotten wrong and what, exactly, the scope of her liability might be.
This Note’s primary purpose is to explain how title attorneys should
employ the MRTA with respect to mineral rights in light of the Rocket
holding. This demands an examination of relevant portions of the opinion
itself. Some argue Rocket is bad law premised on bad statutory interpretation.
This Note, however, demonstrates the opposite: Rocket is good law and
adheres to the most literal reading of the statute. Yet this Note also suggests
that the 1995 Amendment to the MRTA alters which deeds can serve as roots
of title under the thirty-year version of the act. This effectively prevents
mineral deeds filed by individuals who only owned severed mineral rights
from serving as roots of title unless, as in the immediate instance, they were
filed prior to 1930. In coming to that conclusion, this Note argues that the
internal logic of the MRTA is premised on the assumption that it is not self6. Id. § 74.
7. See Kraettli Q. Epperson, Oklahoma’s Marketable Record Title Act: An Argument
for Its Application to Chains of Title to Severed Minerals After Rocket Oil and Gas Co. v.
Donabar, 82 OKLA. B.J. 623 (2011). Mr. Epperson’s response to this Note can be found
following Part V (Crib Sheet). His response focuses on this Note’s interpretation of the
severed mineral exception and the question of whether the MRTA is self-executing below,
infra Parts III.A. and III.C, respectively.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 76(A) (2011).
11. Epperson, supra note 7, at 623.
12. Id. at 624.
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executing and is reliant on a quiet-title action to trigger its effect. Finally, this
Note provides a “crib sheet” that outlines the basic ramifications of the
holding for oil and gas title lawyers.
In order to view Rocket in context, this Note begins with a brief
overview of the issues that gave rise to marketable title acts, followed by a
history of Oklahoma’s MRTA. The conclusion of the preparatory section
looks at how the MRTA was understood and used by title attorneys prior to
the Rocket decision.
B. Defects and Marketable Title
Marketable title is a bedrock concept in property law. In every realproperty transaction (absent clear indication to the contrary), the law
imputes to the seller of real property a promise to convey marketable title
and grants to the buyer the right to receive such title.13 The term itself,
however, has frustratingly resisted satisfying, non-circular definitions—
leaving vague the issue of what, exactly, the seller promises to convey and
what the buyer is entitled to receive. On its own terms, the very fact the
seller sold the property would seem to establish the title as “marketable.”
But it does not. Black’s defines marketable title as “title that a reasonable
buyer would accept because it appears to lack any defect and [appears] to
cover the entire property that the seller has purported to sell.”14 Lewis
Simes, author of the Model Marketable Title Act (Model Act), alludes to a
more cynical definition of marketable title: title a court would be willing to
force upon a buyer.15 Capturing aspects of both, the Oklahoma Bar
Association’s definition requires the vendor to provide title “free from
apparent defects, grave doubts and litigious uncertainty, and consist[ing] of
both legal and equitable title fairly deducible of record.”16
The problem is that most title in the United States has a number of
defects17—and, not surprisingly, any doubt or uncertainty is potentially
“grave” for attorneys. This is especially true in the oil and gas industry
where erroneously attributing mineral rights can mean rental fees and

13. 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser § 86 (2006).
14. Marketable Title, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
15. LEWIS M. SIMES, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 11 (1960).
16. OKLA. BAR ASS’N, 2012 TITLE EXAMINATION STANDARDS HANDBOOK 1 (John B.
Wimbish ed., 2011).
17. Jereme Cowan, Anatomy of a Title Opinion 7 (n.d.) (paper presented at the
Oklahoma Bar Association’s Oil and Gas Title Examination CLE Preparatory Course, Sept.
12, 2013) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review) (noting “[t]he record will most likely
contain a host of title defects”).
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royalties are paid to the wrong person and must be paid again to the rightful
owner. Even in younger states like Oklahoma, the early years of most
chains of title contain gaps in ownership, wild deeds, and ambiguous
descriptions of land.18 Furthermore, farmland in those days often passed
intestate, occasionally not entering probate at all.19 If you add to this the
propensity of survivors of joint tenancies to convey the land without
sufficiently recording their co-tenants death, the high number of title
defects and uncertainties is not surprising.
Mineral interests in Oklahoma are plagued with their own special set of
problems. In oil and gas producing areas, many owners will sever and retain
their mineral interests when conveying property.20 Because Oklahoma has
been producing oil and gas for over one-hundred years, owners severed the
minerals under some tracts of land long ago. When these owners died, the
interests were often fractionalized as they descended to heirs.21 Unlike
fractionalized surface interests, which heirs often unite in one owner for
practical reasons, mineral interests tend to stay fractionalized and keep
dividing.22 Generations of descendants of the owner of an undivided 1/3
interest may all die intestate, with subsequent generations owning
undivided 1/9th interests, then 1/45th interests, then 1/270ths.23 Eventually,
especially as the minerals lay dormant, the exact fractional interest is
forgotten, resulting in erroneously stated interests in deeds and wills or
quitclaim deeds that do not even attempt to describe the conveyed interest.24
For these and other reasons, defects riddle most mineral chains.25 The
crux of the issue, then, is this: property transactions require that title be free
of defect or danger of litigation, but title is full of these defects, potentially
18. Joseph Shade, Petroleum Land Titles: Title Examination & Title Opinions, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 1007, 1059 (1994) (noting “most chains of title, in their early years, reveal
apparent gaps in title [and] conveyancing irregularities”).
19. See Julius J. Zschau et al., Using Land Trusts to Prevent Small Farmer Land Loss,
44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 521, 522 n.1 (2009).
20. Gregory D. Russell & Lauren N. Fromme, The Problem of Dormant Minerals, 33
ENERGY MIN. L. FOUND § 8.02, 289 (2012), http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/
whitepaper/russell_fromme_12.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 8.02, at 289-90.
23. See Shirley Norwood Jones, Constitutional and Practical Problems in Legislation to
Terminate Non-Productive Mineral Interests, 3 MISS. C. L. REV. 175 (1983); see Zschau et
al., supra note 19, at 528 (noting a farm that passed intestate for multiple generations from
1935 to 1978, resulting in sixty-seven people owning an interest, the smallest of which was
1/19,440th).
24. See Zschau et al., supra note 19, at 529.
25. See COWAN, supra note 17, at 7.
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making property transactions a quagmire of liability. The need to convey
otherwise defective title without incurring liability has given rise to a
variety of curative measures, including the Model Act.26
C. The Model Marketable Title Act
Lewis M. Simes introduced the Model Act, based on the Michigan
Marketable Title Act, in 1960.27 Written with the express purpose of
“simplifying and facilitating land title transactions,”28 it basically allowed
that, if a person had an unbroken and recorded chain of title for forty years,
during which time no other person filed a conflicting claim, any and all
claims to a property interest recorded prior to the forty-year period were
extinguished.29 In practice, the key document in the operation of the act is
the “root of title.”30 This document must be a recorded conveyance or title
transaction in the property owner’s chain of title.31 Furthermore, it must
“purport[] to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which [she]
relies as a basis for the marketability of [her] title, and which was the most
recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when
marketability is being determined.”32 The act extinguishes all defects and
other interests in real property, unless otherwise exempted, that are
reflected in the record before the date the root of title was filed.33 And the
Model Act exempts only three interests from its extinguishing work: 1) a
lessor’s reversionary right of possession at the end of a lease; 2) any
easement or similar interest clearly observable by physical evidence of its
use; and 3) any interest owned by the United States.34
An interest otherwise subject to extinguishment can be preserved in two
ways. First, the owner can file a notice within the forty-year period plainly
stating the nature of the claim and a desire to retain it.35 In this manner, by
filing a notice every thirty-nine years, successors in interest can preserve
the interest indefinitely. The second manner of preservation is more
complex. If the same record owner of a possessory interest in land (1)
possesses it for more than forty years, (2) her interest is not otherwise
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See SIMES, supra note 15, at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 4.
See Epperson, supra note 7, at 625.
See SIMES, supra note 15, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
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preserved,36 and (3) she is still in possession at the time that marketable title
is being determined, then her period of possession will be given the same
effect as filing a notice just prior to the expiration of the forty-year period.37
But note: if she dies or conveys the property before the time of
determination, this exception does not apply, and the claim is lost.
Finally, with an eye towards fairness and due process concerns, the
Model Act provides a two-year window after its enactment for the owners
of potentially extinguished property interests to file a preserving affidavit.
Only after this period does the act begin its extinguishing operation.38
Assuming the Model Act were enacted as written, an examiner
inspecting title would use it as follows: beginning with the date forty years
before the date on which he is determining title and moving chronologically
backwards therefrom, he would find the most recently recorded conveyance
of the subject parcel. This document is his potential root of title. After
giving a cursory examination of the previous title documents to determine
easements, interests owned by the federal government, and reversionary,
possessory interests in leases, he would closely scrutinize the documents in
the chain of title for the forty years immediately following the root. Finding
no competing recorded interests, he could safely assume that all interests
previous to the root of title not otherwise excepted were extinguished and
that the title was defect free up to the date of the root. If, however, he found
competing claims in the chain, he would go back to the next closest
preceding conveyance and repeat the process. He would continue moving
back until he found a conveyance followed by forty years of clean title.
That document would be his root, and he could safely conclude that the act
extinguished all competing interests recorded prior to that date.
As a piece of legislation written to address the problem of unmarketable
title due to long-abandoned interests and ancient defects, the Model Act is
unquestionably successful and startlingly thorough. Since its introduction,
eleven states have adopted some version of either the Model Act or its
progeny, the Uniform Marketable Title Act, with nine others adopting
related measures.39 Many of these states’ legislatures were concerned the

36. This could be by another conveyance of an interest or notice of the interest in the
record, such as granting an oil or gas lease or conveying duck-hunting rights to the land. See
id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Jennifer Cohoon McStotts, In Perpetuity or for Forty Years, Whichever Is Less: The
Effect of Marketable Record Title Acts on Conservation and Preservation Easements, 27 J.
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act was too thorough or that people might exploit it by unfairly divesting
individuals of their property with little notice or by fraudulent means. 40 In
response, these states carved out additional exceptions to the act’s
extinguishing power.41 Oklahoma’s decision to do this, and the language it
chose in so doing, lies at the heart of the Rocket controversy.
D. Oklahoma’s Forty-Year MRTA
Oklahoma has passed two versions of the MRTA, the Forty-Year MRTA
and the Thirty-Year MRTA, with the latter amended in 1995 and 1997.42 The
legislature passed the Forty-Year MRTA in 1963, granting property owners
until September 13, 1965, to file affidavits preserving potentially
extinguished interests.43 As passed, the forty-year version is almost identical
to the Model Act in wording and operation, save for the interests exempted
from extinguishment.44 While leaving the exceptions for the reversionary
interest of lessors and interests owned by the federal government unaltered, it
expanded the easement exception to preserve an interest in any easement
whatsoever. It further shielded any additional rights granted, exempted, or
reserved in a document that also created an easement.45 Finally, the
legislature barred “any mineral or royalty interests which has been severed
from the fee simple title of the land” from extinguishment by the MRTA.46 A
detailed analysis of this exception is below.
E. Oklahoma’s Thirty-Year MRTA and Its Amendments
In 1970 the legislature amended the MRTA to be a thirty-year act.47 In
this instance, property owners had until July 1, 1972, to preserve potentially
extinguished interests. The legislature further stipulated that this provision
did not resurrect claims barred under the Forty-Year MRTA.48 Aside from
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 41, 46 (2007) (describing the states that have adopted various
title acts).
40. Patrick H. Martin, Dormant Mineral Acts: Possible Game Changers? 10 (conference
paper presented at “Development Issues in Major Shale Plays: What’s on the Horizon,”
sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, May 1-2, 2014), Westlaw, 2014
No. 2 RMMLF-Inst Paper No. 4.
41. Id.
42. 16 OKLA. STAT. §§ 71-80 (2011).
43. 16 OKLA. STAT. §§ 71(b), 81 (1971).
44. 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 33-35.
45. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 76 (1971).
46. Id. Agreements related to subdivision developments are also excepted therein.
47. 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws 116.
48. Id. at 118.
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this stipulation and the shortening of the necessary unbroken chain of
defect-free title from forty to thirty years, the law remained unchanged.
In 1995, and again in 1997, the legislature modified the Thirty-Year
MRTA to address potential abuses. The 1997 amendment, which forbade
and punished the filing of sham or slanderous title documents, did not affect
the operation of the act and is outside the scope of this Note.49
The 1995 amendment broadened the traditional definition of “severed
mineral interest” and altered the MRTA’s operation in two ways.50 First, the
amendment defined “severed mineral interests” to include mineral
leasehold, working, royalty, and overriding royalty interests, as well as the
traditional definition—a mineral interest without a corresponding interest in
the surface estate.51 It altered the operation of the act by limiting the
instruments that could serve as a root of title for a severed mineral interest
to those executed by a person or entity who—as reflected in the record—
owned more than a severed mineral interest in that parcel.52 Second, it
exempted stray instruments from serving as roots of title under certain
conditions.53 This exception was triggered when the following conditions
were met: (1) the record otherwise contained a valid, uninterrupted chain of
record tracing back at least thirty years to a root of title and (2) the current
owner in the valid chain filed an affidavit alleging (3) that she was in
possession of the property and (4) that the owners under the stray deed
owned no interest in it.54
F. Law Before the Case
Prior to Rocket, very few Oklahoma courts had rendered decisions on the
MRTA, leaving attorneys with little precedent to aid their understanding of
the statute. Relevant caselaw consisted of three, contradictory rulings—one
from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, another from the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals, and a third from the District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma. In 1982, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued Mobbs v. City
of Lehigh.55 Beyond giving a basic overview of the purpose of the MRTA
and its action, Mobbs is noteworthy for those issues which it specifically

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

16 OKLA. STAT. §§ 75, 79 (2011).
1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 932; 16 OKLA. STAT. § 76(D) (2011).
16 OKLA. STAT. § 76(D).
Id. § 76(E).
Id. § 76(B).
Id.
1982 OK 149, 655 P.2d 547.
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declined to settle: the constitutionality of the act56 and whether it was selfexecuting or needed a quiet-title action to trigger its application.57 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court likely chose to mention the issue of selfexecution in response to a much-criticized58 portion of the 1975 Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals opinion, Anderson v. Pickering.59 There, the
Anderson Court declared that the MRTA was not self-executing but was
instead a statutory method for quieting title, requiring formal action to
trigger its operation.60 Unfortunately, the court did not provide the
underlying rationale for its conclusion.61 Perhaps this was why, in 1988, the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma declined to follow
Anderson by concluding that the act was self-executing.62 It further found
the act constitutional.63
The most debated aspect of Rocket is its implied understanding of the
act’s exception for mineral or royalty interest “severed from the fee simple
title of the land”64—an understanding contradicting general industry
practice at that time.65 In Kraettli Epperson’s article on Rocket for the
Oklahoma Bar Journal, he provided two interpretations of this exception.66
The second of these will be described in the Analysis section below, but the
first articulates the industry interpretation at the time Rocket was decided.67
Most attorneys believed that severing the minerals from the surface of a
parcel completely barred the MRTA’s extinguishing power as to that
mineral chain.68 In other words, under this reading severed minerals can
neither be extinguished by operation of the act nor be used as a root of title
to extinguish other mineral interests, severed or unsevered. This
understanding did not survive the Rocket holding.69 Understanding why
requires a close examination of the case.
56. Id. ¶ 7, 655 P.2d at 549. It is not obvious if the court is declining to rule on whether
the act violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Constitution, or both.
57. Id. ¶ 7 n.6, 655 P.2d at 550 n.6.
58. Bennett v. Whitehouse, 690 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
59. 1975 OK CIV APP 42, ¶ 16, 541 P.2d 1361, 1365.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Bennett, 690 F. Supp. at 962.
63. Id. at 960-62.
64. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 76(A) (2011).
65. Epperson, supra note 7, at 624.
66. Id. at 627.
67. Id. at 624, 627.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 624.
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II. Statement of the Case
In 2001, Rocket Oil and Gas Company (Rocket Oil) filed an action in
Pushmatah County court to quiet title in a mineral estate against a number
of defendants.70 Clark Tomassian, trustee of the Martin V. Tomassian
Family Trust and the owner of the surface estate, is the only defendant of
concern here.71 The Pushmatah County court found the Forty-Year MRTA
extinguished all mineral rights, save Rocket Oil’s, and quieted title
accordingly.72 Tomassian appealed the ruling to the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals.73 Its resulting opinion is at issue here.
A. The Facts
At trial, all parties stipulated to the material facts.74 Rocket Oil and
Tomassian derived their competing claims from separate chains of title
originating in the same source—a warranty deed filed August 11, 1924,
conveying the subject parcel in fee simple from R. Van Tress to G. M.
O’Donnell.75 See Figure 1.
Taking Tomassian’s chain first, he traced his interest to a warranty deed
filed June 20, 1922.76 Therein, O’Donnell purported to convey the subject
parcel in fee simple to Avedis Donabed, a resident of Massachusetts.77 Note
that the deed reflecting O’Donnell’s sale of the property appears in the
record two years before the deed reflecting O’Donnell’s acquisition of the
property.78 Donabed filed nothing more of record concerning the parcel
before dying intestate on September 30, 1966.79 On August 30, 1971, the
decedent’s brother, Elias Donabar, filed the next instrument in the chain—a

70. Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar, 2005 CIV APP 111, ¶¶ 1-2, 127 P.3d 625, 62728.
71. Id. ¶ 1, 127 P.3d at 627. Likewise, while there are several named plaintiffs, this Note
will subsume them all under the name “Rocket Oil”.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 3, 127 P.3d at 628.
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶ 5, 127 P.3d at 628.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 127 P.3d at 628.
79. Id. ¶ 5, P.3d at 628.
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warranty deed conveying the property to appellant’s father, Martin V.
Tomassian.80 Subsequently, Martin conveyed the parcel into a family trust
where it stayed, and from which taxes were paid, until trial.81 By time of
trial, Clark Tomassian was trustee.82
Rocket Oil derived its chain of title from a warranty deed filed four years
after Donabed’s, on September 16, 1926.83 Therein, O’Donnell again
purported to convey the subject parcel in fee simple, this time to W.R. and
Estelle Skipper.84 On December 31, 1926, the Skippers filed a deed
conveying only the severed mineral estate to R. F. Garland.85 Garland
conveyed the same via mineral deed, filed February 9, 1927, to Liberty
Royalties Corporation (Liberty).86 Subsequently, in a deed recorded
November 18, 1929, Liberty conveyed the minerals to its president, John
Fernow.87 Fernow then conveyed the interest to United Royalty Company,

80. Id. Elias’s last name on this deed is Donabar, not Donabed. There was likely a
scrivener’s error regarding either the brother or sister’s last name, but neither the record nor
the opinion clarify the issue.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. ¶ 4, 127 P.3d at 628.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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who later declared bankruptcy.88 This resulted in the bankruptcy trustee
conveying the estate back to Liberty in a mineral deed filed December 9,
1946.89 Finally, in a mineral deed filed March 2, 1949, Liberty conveyed
the severed minerals to Rocket Oil and Gas Company, appellee.90 If Rocket
Oil filed further instruments of record reflecting its interest in the mineral
estate, the opinion does not reflect it.
B. Findings of District Court of Pushmataha County
In the District Court of Pushmataha County, Tomassian asserted he was
the rightful owner of the mineral estate based on the Doctrine of After
Acquired Title.91 Rocket Oil replied that its forty years of unbroken mineral
title extinguished Tomassian’s interest in the minerals beneath Tomassian’s
parcel.92 The court quieted title in Rocket Oil.93 On appeal, Tomassian
raised multiple errors in the court’s application of the MRTA and
challenged the act’s constitutionality.94
C. Corollary Issues
The Rocket court articulated the “precise issue” on appeal as “whether
Plaintiffs have ‘marketable record title’ to the minerals sufficient to
extinguish Defendant’s mineral interest.”95 The court additionally rendered
decisions on a number of other issues, some concerning the operation of the
MRTA and others concerning the act’s constitutionality. This Note
addresses corollary issues only insofar as they help to understand the
working of the MRTA. It will not address the constitutional issues.

88. Id. It appears from the opinion that the deeds conveying from Liberty into Fernow
and Fernow into United were filed on the same date. Though this is never explicitly stated,
when searching for a root of title, the court moves from considering the 1946 deed out of
United to analyzing November 18, 1929. See id. ¶¶ 34-35, 127 P.3d at 633.
89. Id. ¶ 4, 127 P.3d at 628.
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 7, 127 P.3d. at 629. The Doctrine of After Acquired Title is the principle that,
if a seller purports to sell a buyer property the seller does not own, should the seller
subsequently acquire title, it will automatically vest in the buyer. After-Acquired-Title
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
92. Rocket, ¶ 7, 127 P.3d at 629.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 8, 127 P.3d. at 629.
95. Id. ¶ 21, 127 P.3d. at 631.
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1. Doctrine of After Acquired Title Does Not Bar the Subsequent Use of
the MRTA
On appeal, Tomassian renewed his argument that the application of the
Doctrine of After Acquired Title caused ownership of the full estate to
transfer to Donabed as rightful owner the moment it was conveyed to
O’Donnell on August 11, 1924.96 The court agreed but noted that the
extinguishing work of the MRTA is not concerned with the legitimacy of
the underlying claims but with the elapse of the requisite number of years
of unbroken title.97 Therefore, it held, assuming the requirements of the
MRTA were met, the legitimacy of Donabed’s interest did not bar its
extinguishment.98
2. Marketability Determined from Time of Filing Suit
The court held that the MRTA determines marketability from the time a
suit is filed by moving back through the chain of title to find the root of
title.99 The court began by determining that the start date for seeking the
root of title, the time when marketability is being determined, is the date
upon which a quiet-title suit is filed100—in this instance, September 10,
2001. With this holding, the court overtly rejected Rocket Oil’s argument
that the MRTA moved forward through the chain.101 Rocket Oil’s argument
assumed the effective date of the root of title was the filing date of the first
document in a title chain—in its instance, December 4, 1926—with the
thirty years of clean title measured from this date forward.102
3. Continuous Possession by Same Owner for Statutory Period Does
Not, on Its Own, Preserve Interest
The court then held that Donabed’s ownership of the property for fortysix years was not enough to trigger the owner-in-continuous-possession
exception found in section 74(b).103 This exception posits that if the owner
in possession of the land at the time title is being determined has
continuously possessed it for more than a thirty- or forty-year period
(depending on the version of the statute), it has the same effect as if the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 127 P.3d at 629-30.
Id. ¶ 16, 127 P.3d. at 630.
Id. ¶ 18, 127 P.3d at 630.
Id. ¶ 30, 127 P.3d at 632-33.
Id. ¶ 29, 127 P.3d at 632.
Id. ¶¶ 23, 27, 127 P.3d at 631, 32.
Id.
Id. ¶ 45, 127 P.3d at 635.
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owner had filed notice of record that she intended to preserve the interest,
thwarting the MRTA’s extinguishing power.104 Because Donabed’s fortysix-year ownership ended thirty-five years prior to the time of title
determination, the court ruled Tomassian’s interest was excluded from this
provision’s protection.105
D. Primary Issue
The primary holding of Rocket was that Rocket Oil had market record
title sufficient to extinguish Tomassian’s mineral interest on November 18,
1969, forty years after the filing of Rocket Oil’s root of title.106 Recall that
under the MRTA, a conveyance must create or convey the interest claimed
to qualify as a root.107 In this case, Rocket Oil claimed the mineral estate
underlying Tomassian’s forty-acre parcel.108 The court, therefore, limited its
search to only those deeds purporting to convey severed mineral rights.109
The court began its analysis with the Thirty-Year Act.110 As
demonstrated in Figure 1, to find Rocket Oil’s root, the court searched
potential roots of title by preceding back through its title chain, beginning
on September 10, 1971, thirty years prior to the date for which title was
being determined, September 10, 2001.111 The first such conveyance was
the mineral deed filed March 2, 1949.112 With this as a potential root, the
court then examined the next thirty years for a competing interest of
record.113 One such interest was found twenty-two years later in the
warranty deed filed in Tomassian’s chain on August 30, 1971.114 The 1971
deed purported to convey the parcel in fee simple.115 Because Rocket Oil’s
possible root and the 1971 deed conflicted as to ownership of the subject
parcel’s mineral interest, the 1949 deed could not serve as root.116 The court
then proceeded back to the next potential root of Rocket Oil’s chain: a

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 48, 127 P.3d at 636.
Id. ¶¶ 21, 22 127 P.3d at 631.
Id. ¶ 1, 127 P.3d at 627.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 28-31, 127 P.3d at 632-33.
Id. ¶ 31, 127 P.3d at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 127 P.3d at 628.
Id. ¶ 33, 127 P.3d at 633.
See id.
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mineral deed filed in 1946.117 However, the same competing interest—the
1971 deed in Tomassian’s chain—again ended the period of unchallenged
title before the necessary thirty years elapsed, this time after twenty-five
years.118
Moving back yet again, the court found Rocket Oil’s root, a mineral deed
filed November 18, 1929.119 Once more, no competing interest in
Tomassian’s chain appeared until the above-mentioned 1971 deed.120
Although this forty-two year period easily met the required stretch of clear
title under the Thirty-Year Act, the grace period of that act extended until
July 1,1972, meaning the 1971 deed again denied the extinguishing power
of the Thirty-Year Act.121
The court then turned its attention to the forty-year version.122 Applying
this act, the court determined that on November 18, 1969, the 1929 deed
met the requisite forty-year period of clear title and extinguished all
competing claims filed prior to Rocket Oil’s root.123 Because one such
competing claim was the 1922 warranty deed Tomassian relied on for his
claim, the court held that his mineral interest was severed from the surface
and extinguished in 1969.124 Finally, noting that the MRTA specified that
an interest, once extinguished, cannot be revived by a later reintroduction in
the record, the court ruled that neither the 1971 warranty deed in
Tomassian’s chain nor his subsequent tax payments could serve to
reestablish his interest.125
III. Analysis
A. Severed Minerals
Recall that the debate surrounding Rocket centered on the court’s implied
interpretation of the MRTA’s severed-minerals exception.126 In particular,
this interpretation contradicted the general industry understanding among
attorneys at that time—that the MRTA excepted severed minerals from

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. ¶ 34, 127 P.3d at 633.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 35, 41, 127 P.3d at 633, 634.
Id. ¶ 36, 127 P.3d at 633-34.
Id.
Id. ¶ 39, 127 P.3d at 634.
Id. ¶ 40, 127 P.3d at 634.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 127 P.3d at 634.
Epperson, supra note 7, at 623.
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extinguishment and excepted severed-mineral conveyances from serving as
roots of title to extinguish competing non-severed interests.127
The industry’s previous interpretation has several advantages. First, it
intuitively seems right. Whatever reason the legislature chose to protect
severed mineral interests would seem to apply with at least as much force to
mineral interests still attached to the surface. Further, and this may be the
crux of this interpretation’s appeal, this understanding provided
practitioners with an easy-to-understand, bright-line rule: the MRTA can be
ignored as to severed mineral title chains. However, because the Rocket
court held that a mineral deed extinguished an unsevered mineral interest,
this interpretation did not survive the holding. Unfortunately, the court
never overtly discussed the severed-mineral exception in its opinion,
thereby yanking from title attorneys their traditional interpretation of it
while simultaneously providing no new interpretation to fill the void.
Epperson has suggested a second interpretation of the severed-mineral
exception—this one in keeping with the Rocket holding.128 His reading is
focused on the MRTA’s description of the excepted interest itself—a
“mineral . . . interest which has been severed from the fee simple title of the
land.”129 He suggests this language be read to bar a severed mineral interest
from being extinguished by a subsequent deed in the same chain of title
when the grantor of a surface interest fails to except the previously severed
minerals when describing the lands.130
Imagine the following: In 1967, O granted Blackacre to A in fee simple.
In 1968, A conveyed the minerals under Blackacre via mineral deed to B.
Then, in 1969, A conveyed the surface of Blackacre to C, excepting the
minerals. Five years later, C conveyed Blackacre to D via warranty deed
but forgot to except the minerals therein, triggering the presumption that C
conveyed to D in fee simple.131 B never filed any notice of record to
preserve her mineral interest.
Under Epperson’s preferred interpretation, C’s warranty deed to D could
not serve as a root of title to extinguish B’s severed mineral interest because
they are in the same chain of title. However, on the same facts, now assume
127. Id. at 624.
128. Id. at 627. Mr. Epperson’s response to this Note’s suggested reading of the mineral
exception is found below.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 29 (2011). (“Every estate in land . . . granted, conveyed or
demised by deed . . . shall be deemed an estate in fee simple . . . unless limited by express
words.”).
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that in 1972, K, who is not part of D’s title chain, purported to convey
Blackacre to L in fee simple via warranty deed. Under Epperson’s reading,
after thirty years, the 1972 conveyance from K to L would extinguish B’s
severed mineral interest. This is because, under this interpretation, the
exception only applies when a severed mineral interest would otherwise be
extinguished by a subsequent conveyance in the same chain of title.
Because L’s interest was not from the same chain, the exception does not
apply, and the MRTA would extinguish the severed-mineral interest just as
it would a fee-simple interest or surface interest.
This reading has the advantage of explaining the statute’s otherwise
awkward description of the excepted interest: “any mineral . . . interest
which has been severed from the fee simple title of the land . . . .”132 The
logic of the argument is that if the drafters wished to bar the extinguishing
of all severed minerals, they would have simply said the MRTA exempts
severed minerals from extinguishment. Epperson suggests the otherwise
superfluous phrase “from the fee simple title of the land” denotes which
title cannot be used to extinguish the minerals—the title from which the
minerals were originally severed.133 This reading has the further advantage
of addressing the foreseeable scenario in which the oversight of a surface
owner in forgetting to exempt the mineral interest in a granting deed
inadvertently divests the rightful owner of her minerals.
Whatever advantages Emerson’s interpretation possesses, it is plagued
by the same significant drawback as the traditional interpretation: it requires
the interpreter to assume things not within the four corners of the statute.
Under the so-called “golden rule” of statutory interpretation, one should
look outside the four corners of the text for interpretive help only if the
statute is ambiguous on its face.134 The MRTA’s exception for severed
minerals, while perhaps confounding, is not ambiguous.
In this Note I suggest a third possible interpretation of the severedmineral exception. This interpretation posits that severed minerals are
always barred from being extinguished by the MRTA and that they are only
barred from extinguishment, not from serving as roots of title. Like
Epperson’s, this interpretation adheres to the Rocket holding. But it has the
further benefit of being the most straightforward reading of the statute. The
statute’s plain and unambiguous language is that the exception applies to
severed mineral interests.135 Mineral interests, in general, are nowhere
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. § 76.
Epperson, supra note 7, at 627.
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
16 OKLA. STAT. §§ 72, 76.
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barred from extinguishment. This makes sense. If all mineral interests were
excluded from the act’s work, a fee-simple root of title could not fully
extinguish a competing fee-simple interest. The surface interest would be
extinguished, but the mineral interest, being exempted from the act’s work,
would remain—defeating the act’s purpose of rendering defect-free title.
The question, then, becomes whether the MRTA, on its face, allows a
conveyance of severed minerals to serve as a root of title to extinguish
unsevered mineral interests. The answer, supplied by the interrelationship
of three definitions in section 78 of the MRTA, is an unequivocal “yes.”136
The act defines “marketable record title” as “a title . . . which operates to
extinguish . . . interests . . . existing prior to the . . . root of title . . . .”137
“Root of title” is defined as “that conveyance or other title transaction . . .
upon which [a person] relies as a basis for the marketability of his
title . . . .”138 Finally, “[t]itle transaction” is “any transaction affecting title
to any interest in land, including title by . . . mineral deed . . . .”139 Taken
together, the unavoidable conclusion is that a mineral deed is a title
transaction that can serve as a root of title and provide the basis for
extinguishing other interests—including mineral interests—assuming no
exceptions apply. Therefore, because only severed minerals are explicitly
exempted from this action, it follows that a mineral deed can extinguish
mineral interests that have not been severed from the fee-simple title.140
Any doubts that still survive should fall to the statute’s instruction to
construe it “liberally” to “allow[ ] persons to rely on a record chain of
title . . . subject only to such limitation as appear in . . . this act.”141 A
mineral deed, then, can serve as a root of title to extinguish any interest not
expressly excepted from the MRTA’s work—including a non-severed
mineral interest.

136. Id. § 78. These definitions have remained unchanged since the original passing of
the Forty-Year Act.
137. Id. § 78(a) (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 78(e) (emphasis added).
139. Id. § 78(f). The full list of conveyances includes “title by will or descent, title by tax
deed, mineral deed, lease or reservation, or by trustee’s, referee’s, guardian’s, executor’s,
administrator’s, master in chancery’s, sheriff’s or marshal’s deed, or decree of any court, as
well as warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage.” Id.
140. As alluded to above, see supra note 50, and more fully examined below, see
discussion infra Part III.B, in 1995 the legislature limited the instances in which mineral
deeds could serve as roots of title in section 76(C).
141. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 80.
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B. 1995 Amendment to Section 76
While the traditional interpretation of the MRTA banning mineral deeds
from serving as roots of title cannot be supported by the severed-minerals
exception, section 76(C)—a product of the 1995 amendment to the
MRTA—partially does. The Rocket court considered most of the MRTA’s
exceptions, but it failed to consider section 76(C), an exception that initially
would appear to bar the 1929 mineral deed in Rocket Oil’s chain from
being used as a root to extinguish Tomassian’s interest.142 The court nodded
to the 1995 amendment only to say it did not apply,143 explaining via
footnote that the amendment forbade stray deeds from serving as roots
under certain conditions.144 That accurately describes section 76(B).145
However, section 76(C) reads that “[a]n instrument executed by a
person . . . who . . . does not otherwise appear in the chain of record title to
a tract of real property, except as an owner of severed mineral interest
therein, shall not create a root of title.”146 That is, a deed executed by a
person who the record reflects never owned more than a mineral interest in
the parcel cannot be used as a root. This exactly describes the 1929 deed the
court identifies as Rocket Oil’s root.
Recall that the deed the court identified as Rocket Oil’s root was a
mineral deed with Liberty as grantor and Furrow as grantee.147 Liberty
received this mineral interest from Garland in a deed filed in 1927.148
Garland, in turn, received the mineral estate via a conveyance filed
December 31, 1926, with the Skippers as grantors.149 The Skippers, having
received the subject parcel in fee simple from O’Donnell in September of
that year, appear to be the last conveyors in Rocket Oil’s chain that owned
more than a mineral estate in the subject parcel.150 So if section 76(C)
governs mineral deeds serving as roots under the Forty-Year Act, a deed
executed by Furrow, who never owned more than mineral interest, could
not serve as a root. Neither could one executed by Liberty nor could one by
Garland. If section 76(C) applies, Rocket Oil’s root must be the December
142.
625.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. § 76(C); Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar, 2005 OK CIV APP 111, 127 P.3d
Rocket, ¶ 11, 127 P.3d at 629.
Id. ¶ 11 n.5.
16 OKLA. STAT. § 76(B).
Id. § 76(C).
Rocket, ¶ 4, 127 P.3d at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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31, 1926, mineral deed. The relevant question then, and the one not
answered by caselaw, is at what point section 76(C) limitations take effect.
Because Tomassian’s chain of title contains nothing of record from 1922
to 1971,151 whether the correct root is the 1929 or 1926 deed is
inconsequential to the result. However, on slightly different facts—say if
Donabed had leased the minerals in 1927—that question would be outcome
determinative. Foreseeably, on other parcels where minerals were severed
early, section 76(C) could move roots of title back seventy or more years.
There are three possible options for when section 76(C) would bar
qualifying deeds from use as roots of title.
! Option One: Section 76(C) always applies, both to situations
governed by the Forty- and Thirty-Year Acts.
! Option Two: Section 76(C) does not apply to situations governed
by the Forty-Year Act—deeds filed before March 27, 1930152—
but applies to all situations governed by the Thirty-Year Act.
! Option Three: Section 76(C) only applies to deeds that become
potential roots of title at some point after the 1995 amendment
was passed. Because deeds can only become roots thirty years
after filing, Option Three would limit the applicability of section
76(c) to only deeds filed after 1965.
Analyzing each option in turn, it becomes evident that Option Two
(section 76(C) applies to all roots governed by the Thirty-Year act) is likely
correct. Returning to Option One, in passing the Thirty-Year MRTA, the
legislature specifically stipulated that it did not revive claims barred under
the Forty-Year MRTA.153 Because it is hard to imagine that an amendment
to the Thirty-Year MRTA could do what the Act itself could not—revive a
previously barred claim—Option One is unlikely.
Between Options Two and Three, a difference of thirty-five years, the
issue turns on whether the Act is self-executing. Here is why: if the Act was
self-executing, by the end of 1994, all the competing interests to roots filed
before the close of 1964 would already be extinguished. So, at the passing
of 1995 amendment, any interests in competition with roots to which it
151. Id. ¶ 5, 127 P.3d at 628.
152. March 27, 1970, is the date upon which the Thirty-Year MRTA was enacted,
thereby terminating the work of the Forty-Year. 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws 118. March 27,
1930, then, would be the last day on which a deed filed could meet the forty-year period of
defect-free title prior to the cessation of the Forty-Year MRTA’s work.
153. 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws 118.
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might apply prior to 1964 were extinguished. As a practical matter, as to
these interests, the 1995 amendment would have no effect. For example, a
July 1, 1964, mineral deed that is uncontroverted for thirty years would
extinguish all competing interests on July 1, 1994. An amendment the
following year would not spare these interests from extinguishment. For
these reasons, if the MRTA is self-executing, Option Three—that section
76(C) applies only to deeds filed after 1965—must be correct.
On the other hand, if the MRTA is not self-executing, thus requiring the
filing of a quiet-title suit to trigger its action, any root established under the
Thirty-Year MRTA would be subject to 76(C), making Option Two correct.
The logic here is straightforward. If the filing of a suit triggers the action of
the statute, the act as enacted at the time the suit was filed would control
what documents could serve as roots and, by extension, what interests could
be extinguished.154 If, as is argued below, the inner-workings of the MRTA
are best explained as not self-executing, Option Two is likely correct. In
that instance, deeds recorded after March 27, 1930, by persons whom the
record does not reflect ever owned more than a severed mineral interest,
cannot serve as roots of title.
C. MRTA Is Not Self-Executing
The best understanding of the MRTA is that its inner workings require
the filing of a quiet-title suit to actually extinguish interests, but that its
purpose is to allow practitioners to rely on it as if it were self-executing.155
As mentioned above, whether the MRTA is self-executing is undecided
under Oklahoma law. In 1975, the Court of Civil Appeals declared the Act
was not,156 and in 1982 the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly declined to
rule on the issue.157 The Western District of Oklahoma’s 1988 finding in
Bennett that it was self-executing is neither binding nor, as is argued below,
particularly persuasive.158 The Rocket court did not specifically address the
issue, but in many ways the opinion reads as if the Act is self-executing.
For instance, the court states, “On that date [November 19, 1969],
Donabed’s pre-root interest in the minerals became extinguished . . . .”159

154. The logic here is premised on the assumption that the quiet-title action was filed
after the addition of section 76(C) in 1995.
155. Contra Addendum by Kraettli Q. Epperson, infra.
156. Anderson v. Pickering, 1975 OK CIV APP 42, ¶ 16, 541 P.2d 1361, 1365.
157. Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 1982 OK 149, ¶ 7, n.6, 655 P.2d 547, 550 n.6.
158. Bennett v. Whitehouse, 690 F. Supp. 955, 962 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
159. Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar, 2005 OK CIV APP 11, ¶ 40, 127 P.3d 625, 634.
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The Bennett finding that the MRTA is self-executing relies exclusively
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,160 a case that
determined the constitutionality of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse Act.161 This act,
while extinguishing mineral interests, is materially different from the
MRTA in its execution. Under the Lapse Act, severed mineral interests
allowed to lie dormant for twenty years automatically lapse back to the
surface owner unless a preserving affidavit is filed.162 The filing of a quiettitle suit is not necessary to trigger this action, and it applies equally to all
severed mineral interests.163 In contradiction, the MRTA, as Rocket makes
explicit, requires that the filing of a quiet-title suit is the “time when
marketability is . . . determined”164 and, as such, controls what deeds may
count as roots of title165 and whether the exception for owners in possession
is triggered.166 By itself, Texaco does not settle this issue.
There are strong hints within the internal logic of the MRTA that it
cannot be self-executing. To begin with, only the filing of a quiet-title suit
can trigger the owner-in-possession exception. Recall this exception creates
the legal fiction that a preserving affidavit was recorded just before the end
of the thirty-year period of clean title if, at the time of filing an action, an
owner in possession for more than thirty years continued to possess the
subject parcel.167 At the least, that exception is not self-executing. But if the
rest of the Act is self-executing, an after-filed root might have already
extinguished the owner in possession’s interest, making the affidavit moot
and the exception meaningless.
Further, by statute and as outlined by the Rocket court, the manner in
which the root is determined requires the filing of a quiet-title suit. First,
the root by definition is limited to those deeds relied upon to create the
interest claimed.168 Therefore, it is the filing of the action that determines
what deeds can serve as roots—and, by extension, what interests are
160. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
161. Bennett, 690 F. Supp. at 960, 962. The Rocket court relied heavily on Texaco for
determination of constitutionality issues. These issues, while interesting and, in my belief,
far from decided, are not within the purview of this Note.
162. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518.
163. See id.
164. Rocket, ¶¶ 29-30, 127 P.3d at 632 (emphasis omitted).
165. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 71 (2011).
166. Id. § 74(b).
167. Id.
168. Rocket, ¶ 30, 127 P.3d at 632; 16 OKLA. STAT. § 78(e) (“‘Root of title’ means that
conveyance . . . in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by
such person . . . .”).
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extinguished. Second, the root is determined by beginning at the time of
filing suit and moving backwards. A self-executing statute would move
forward through time. Consider the immediate case. The subject parcel was
conveyed in fee simple by a deed filed in Rocket Oil’s chain on September
16, 1926.169 From this filing date until 1971, a competing claim was not
filed in Tomassian’s chain.170 If the MRTA were self-executing,
Tomassian’s entire estate would have been extinguished on September 16,
1966, forty years after the 1926 deed’s filing. Indeed, this is the approach
adopted by the district court—an approach specifically condemned within
the Rocket opinion.171
The Rocket court never considered that Tomassian’s entire property
interest was extinguished because (1) by statute, Rocket Oil would be
limited to a deed creating the interest it was claiming—a mineral interest—
to serve as its root, and (2) the court was working backwards, so it never
even reached the 1926 deed. If the act is self-executing, these stipulations
are nonsensical and the Rocket holding is misleading. The mineral estate the
court declares extinguished in 1969 would have been extinguished several
years earlier, along with the rest of appellant’s estate. On the other hand, if
the MRTA requires the filing of a quiet-title action to trigger its
extinguishing power, the stipulations make sense. Because interests are not
extinguished until a suit is filed and because the interest claimed at the
suit’s filing determines what is extinguished, the MRTA’s internal logic
must operate on the premise that the act is not self-executing.
On the other hand, if the MRTA is to achieve its stated purpose of
expediting the conveying of property,172 it is evident that, as an external
matter, the MRTA must be relied on as if it were self-executing—or at least
as if the quiet-title suit had already been filed and decided. This makes
sense of the language in section 80 that states that the act should be
construed to “allow[ ] persons to rely on a record chain of title . . . .”173
Admittedly, it does not exactly square with the language of section 73,
which states that all competing claims are “hereby declared to be null and

169. Rocket, ¶ 4, 127 P.3d at 628.
170. Id. ¶ 5, 127 P.3d at 628.
171. Id. ¶ 30, 127 P.3d at 632-33 (“[O]ne must begin at [the time marketability is being
determined] and proceed back through the chain, not forward from the chain’s source, as
erroneously decided by the trial court.”) (emphasis omitted).
172. 16 OKLA. STAT. § 80.
173. Id.
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void” once the statutory period of defect-free title has been met,174 but it
does give effect to it.
When a law contains apparently contradictory assumptions, the wisest
course of action—until the courts or the legislature offer clarification—may
be to proceed as if each assumption is true in its realm. Because aspects of
the MRTA cannot be self-executing and the internal workings of the Act
would be non-sense if it were, relative to its internal workings and
amendments to them, the MRTA is best understood as not self-executing.
When considering these issues, assume the MRTA requires legal action to
extinguish interests. For title examination purposes, however, the
practitioner should rely on the MRTA as if it is self-executing and interests
are extinguished the moment the statutory period of clear title has elapsed.
Another way of stating this is that it takes legal action for the MRTA to
actually extinguish mineral interests, but the act is self-executing in
declaring title “marketable,” and that declaration is sufficiently reliable to
functionally extinguish other interests. While this approach may be
logically problematic, lawyers in practice have done this with no difficulty
since 1965, and it is the best way to make sense of statutory language and
the Rocket holding.
IV. Conclusion
In 2005 Rocket v. Donabar rocked the world of Oklahoma oil and gas
title by contradicting the settled industry interpretation of the severedminerals exception to the MRTA—a statute title attorneys use and rely
upon daily. Since that holding, no general consensus has formed regarding
how this important exception should now be construed. This Note has
suggested one interpretation: the MRTA can never be used to extinguish
any severed mineral interests, but severed mineral conveyances can serve as
roots to extinguish mineral interests not yet severed from the surface. This
reading is in keeping with the Rocket holding and has the added benefits of
being easy to implement and the most literal interpretation of the statutory
language. This Note further opined that section 76(C), a product of the 1995
MRTA amendment not discussed within the Rocket opinion, limits
instances where mineral conveyances can serve as roots of title. This
provision limits such instances to those in which the grantor had an
ownership claim of record to some interest in the property beyond the
severed minerals. Finally, this Note suggested that section 76(C) would

174. Id. § 73.
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likely apply to all potential roots governed by the Thirty-Year MRTA but
not those governed by the Forty-Year.
As improved extraction techniques have resurrected long-dormant or
barely producing oil and gas fields, oil and gas title opinions on mineral
interests are the basis for the distribution of millions of dollars.175 With
these millions comes millions in legal liability. Because these opinions
often deal with property—like that in Rocket—where mineral interests were
long ago severed from the surface, a solid understanding of the implications
of Rocket for the application of the MRTA to severed mineral interests is
essential for oil and gas title attorneys. With that in mind, this Note
concludes with an MRTA “crib sheet” of sorts for attorneys in the field.
This crib sheet summarizes the implications of the severed-mineralexception interpretation suggested above in two formats: a list of assertions
and a flowchart. Both include operative dates and basic instructions
predicated on the approaches outlined in this opinion, including deeds that
fall within the transitional period from the Forty-Year to the Thirty-Year
MRTA.
V. Crib Sheet
The basic manner in which roots of title are found and competing
interests extinguished, above,176 was confirmed by the Rocket court and is
assumed throughout this crib sheet and the accompanying flowchart (See
Figure 2).
Severed Mineral Interests
! Severed mineral interests are always exempted from
extinguishment. To begin the examination, while scanning
chronologically forward through the documents of record for
exceptions to the MRTA’s work, note all documents purporting
to create a severed mineral interest. These interests are not
extinguishable by either the Thirty- or Forty-Year MRTA. These
chains must be carefully analyzed for defects of any type not
otherwise subject to curative measures.

175. A total of 351,000 barrels per day were produced in Oklahoma in October of 2014,
Petroleum and Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPOK2&f=M (last visited Jan. 19, 2015), at a value
in excess of $80 per barrel, Crude Oil, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crudeoil.aspx?timeframe=6m (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
176. Infra Part I.C.
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! Conveyances of severed mineral interests can serve as roots of
title. A severed-mineral conveyance can always serve as a root
of title to extinguish non-severed mineral interests. For
documents filed on or after March 27, 1930,177 this ability to
serve as a root is subject to the limitations imposed by section
76(C), further described below.
Potential Roots of Title Filed on or After March 27, 1930
! These conveyances are subject to the Thirty-Year MRTA.178
! A potential root filed on or between March 27, 1930,179 and July
1, 1942, requires a period of uncontroverted chain of title
extending until July 1, 1972, to serve as a root of title.180

177. See supra note 153.
178. See supra note 153.
179. See supra note 153.
180. See 16 OKLA. STAT. § 71 (2011). Under the Thirty-Year MRTA, possessors of
property interest had until July 1, 1972, the act’s effective date, to file notice of their
intention to preserve a potentially extinguished claim. Therefore, potential roots whose
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! A potential root filed on or after July 2, 1942,181 requires a thirtyyear period of defect-free title to qualify as a root of title.
! Section 76(C) does apply. A document executed by a person or
entity who the record reflects never had an ownership claim
except to the severed minerals in a particular parcel is barred
from serving as a root of title.
! To serve as a root of title in a title chain, the document must
create the interest claimed.182
Potential Roots of Title Filed Prior to March 27, 1930
! These conveyances are subject to the Forty-Year MRTA.183
! A potential root filed on or before September 13, 1925, requires
a period of defect-free title extending until September 13, 1965,
to serve as a root of title.184
! A potential root filed on or between September 14, 1925,185 and
March 26, 1930,186 requires a forty-year period of defect-free
title to qualify as a root of title.
! Section 76(C) does not apply. No special limitations are placed
on a document filed by an owner of a severed mineral interest to
serve as a root of title.

thirty-year period of clear title end prior to that date must continue to be defect free until that
date.
181. The first date of filing for a potential root whose period of clear title extends beyond
the effective date of the Thirty-Year Act.
182. Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar, 2005 OK CIV APP 111, ¶ 30, 127 P.3d 625, 632.
183. See supra note 153, for an explanation of how March 27, 1930, is determined as the
final date upon which potential deeds filed are governed by the Forty-Year MRTA.
184. See Rocket, ¶ 9, 127 P.3d at 629. Under the Forty-Year MRTA, possessors of
property interest had until September 13, 1965, the Act’s effective date, to file notice of their
intention to preserve a potentially extinguished claim. Therefore, potential roots whose
forty-year period of clear title end prior to that date must continue to be defect free until that
date.
185. The first date of filing for a potential root whose period of clear title extends beyond
the effective date of the Forty-Year Act.
186. See supra note 153.
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! To serve as a root of title in a title chain, the document must
create the interest claimed.187
Jason Hubbert
Addendum by Kraettli Q. Epperson
Jason Hubbert has crafted an excellent article concerning the meaning of
the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decision Rocket v. Donabar188 and it
is a significant contribution to the discussion among Oklahoma's mineral
title examiners.
Mr. Hubbert suggests a solution to the continuing question as to whether
Oklahoma's powerful curative act, the thirty-year Marketable Record Title
Act,189 helps to clarify land titles involving mineral interests.
The dilemma is caused by the two apparently conflicting provisions of
the MRTA: (1) the clear listing a “mineral deed” as a possible “root of
title”190 and (2) the express exclusion of “severed” mineral interests from
the extinguishment effect of the Act.191
However, with the application of piercing analysis, Mr. Hubbert
reconciles these two seemingly inconsistent provisions by suggesting that a
mineral deed, which is recorded for at least thirty years, can and does act as
a “root of title” and, thereby, does extinguish any potentially competing
pre-root un-severed mineral interests. For instance, if a pre-root owner
holds fee simple title (including 100% of both the surface and minerals) and
a mineral deed is subsequently filed, then, after thirty-years (and with no
additional recorded transaction by the original fee simple owner) the holder
of the mineral deed owns Marketable Record Title to the previously unsevered mineral interest.
Mr. Hubbert also addresses the other significant nagging (but usually
ignored) question, as to whether the MRTA is “self-executing” or whether a
court action needed in every instance to establish title in any person
claiming title based on the MRTA's extinguishment ability. If the Act could
be conclusively determined to be self-executing (as most examiners
currently assume), such feature would go a long way towards implementing

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Rocket, ¶ 30, 127 P.3d at 632.
2005 OK CIV APP 111, 127 P.3d 625
16 OKLA. STAT. §§ 71-80 (2011).
Id. §§ 78(f).
Id. §§ 72, 76.
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the Act's “legislature purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title
transactions,” by confirming that there is no need for court action.
However, Mr. Hubbert suggests, based on some of the language in
Rocket, that a court action is needed, to achieve any benefit under the Act.
However, the Act is directed at current and prospective owners. The
consideration of the Act by title examiners and courts is only secondary. It
is true that the thirty-year cleansing effect of the Act is considered only
when a person (e.g., a prospective purchaser or lender) is reviewing the
title, and, consequently, such date of review is a moving target, as time
passes.
There is no reason for such date of determination to be limited to the date
a lawsuit is filed. The application of the law is not “triggered” only by the
action of filing a lawsuit. It is activated by the proper placement of
instruments in “the record” at the time of such determination by a
prospective buyer/lender, or by a title examiner or a court. In other words,
you can acquire Marketable Record Title (after thirty-years), and then rest
in the assurance that you have statutory Marketable Record Title. However,
you must remember to “re-record” every thirty years.
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